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Border Peace And Tranquility Agreement 1993 Wikipedia

China`s military action has been seen by the US as part of the PRC`s policy of using wars of aggression to settle its border disputes and divert both its own population and international opinion from its internal issues. [78] According to James Calvin of the United States Marine Corps, Western nations then viewed China as an aggressor during the Sino-Indian border war, and the war was part of a monolithic communist target for a global dictatorship of the proletariat. This was triggered by Mao Zedong`s point of view: “The path to conquering the world passes through Havana, Accra and Calcutta.” Calvin believes that Chinese actions have a model of conservative and limited goals rather than expansionism and holds India`s provocations toWard China responsible for this particular conflict. Calvin also claims that China has in the past insisted on taking control of areas to which it has a “traditional right,” which sparked the dispute over NEFA and Aksai Chin and Tibet. Calvin`s hypothesis, based on the history of the Cold War and the domino effect, assumed that China could eventually try to regain control of everything it considers “traditionally Chinese,” which he said encompassed all of Southeast Asia. [16] The Indian Modi government could also be linked to few credible – or desirable – options for retaliation against China. Although the Indian government has earned a reputation for toughness vis-à-vis its other major rival, Pakistan, where the Indian government authorized a leading cross-border attack in 2016 and airstrikes last year, the potential for a costly accidental escalation with China is far greater. Nehrus` response of 27 October expressed interest in restoring peace and friendly relations and proposed a return to the “border before 8 September 1962”. He was categorically concerned about a mutual withdrawal of twenty kilometers (12 miles) after “40 or 60 kilometers (25 or 40 miles) of blatant military aggression.” He wanted the creation of a larger immediate buffer zone, thus opposing the possibility of a repeat offensive. Zhou`s November 4 response reiterated his 1959 offer to return to the McMahon Line in NEFA, and the Chinese traditionally claimed the MacDonald Line at Aksai Chin. Faced with The Chinese armed forces asserting themselves on Indian soil and trying to escape political pressure, the Indian parliament announced a national emergency and passed a resolution in which it declared its intention to “drive the aggressors out of India`s sacred soil.”