On September 30, 1938, Germany, Great Britain, France and Italy agreed on an agreement authorizing the German annexation of the Sudetenland in western Czechoslovakia. The area had about three million people of German origin, and in May 1938 it was reported that Hitler and his generals planned to occupy the country. After learning that areas inhabited by Poland were to be transferred to Germany, Poland issued a note to the Czechoslovak government in which it called for “the immediate conclusion of an agreement according to which Polish territory would be indisputably occupied by Polish troops; this was followed by agreement on referendums in districts where the Polish population was densely populated.  The Prime Minister had already sent a message to the Czecho-Slovak people on September 30, 1940, set out the position of His Majesty`s Government on the agreements concluded in Munich in 1938. Lord. Churchill then said that the Munich Agreement had been destroyed by the Germans. This statement was formally communicated to Dr. Beneš on November 11, 1940. The munich quote in foreign policy debates is also common in the twenty-first century.  During negotiations on the Iran nuclear deal by Secretary of State John Kerry, a Republican lawmaker from Texas called the negotiations “worse than Munich.” Kerry himself had invoked Munich in a speech in France, in which he campaigned for military action in Syria by saying, “This is our Munich moment.”  During World War II, British Prime Minister Churchill, who rejected the agreement when it was signed, decided that the terms of the agreement would not be respected after the war and that the Sudenian regions should be returned to post-war Czechoslovakia. On August 5, 1942, the Foreign Secretary, Anthony Eden, sent the following note to Jan Masaryk: A French opinion poll conducted in early October 1938 showed that 57% were in favour of Dladier`s policy, 37% were against and 6% undecided, very similar to the British figures in Munich. But 70% also responded that all of Hitler`s other demands had to be resisted. The shadow of World War I caused panic in September, just before Munich.
However, during the crisis, French opinion was only fluid. The agreement was widely welcomed. French Prime Minister Daladier did not believe, in the words of one scholar, that a European war was justified “to keep three million Germans under Czech sovereignty.” But the same argument applies to Alsace-Lorraine – unlike the alliance between France and Czechoslovakia against German aggression. Gallup polls in the UK, France and the US showed that the majority of the population supported the deal. Mr. Beneš, President of Czechoslovakia, was nominated in 1939 for the Nobel Peace Prize.  Daladier believed that Hitler`s ultimate goals posed a threat. He told the British at a meeting in late April 1938 that Hitler`s real long-term goal was to ensure “domination over the continent in relation to which Napoleon`s ambitions were low.” He continued: “Today it is the turn of Czechoslovakia. Tomorrow it will be the turn of Poland and Romania.
If Germany has received the oil and wheat it needs, it will turn against the West. Certainly, we must multiply our efforts to avoid war. . . .